This page displays correctly in the Firefox or Mozilla browsers, and in Safari for Mac OS X. It may not display correctly in Internet Explorer 6 for Windows, so IE users may want to view the pdf version
ISSN 1076-9005 Volume 11 2004
A Survey of the Sources of Buddhist Ethicss
By Dr. Ian J. Coghlan
Translator for The Institute of Tibetan Classics
Montreal, Canada
Queensland, Australia
Georgetown University ian@dharmamegha.com
Abstract: This article surveys two sources of ethics in Therāvada
Buddhism. Firstly, it briefly surveys the texts that record
the process of the proclamation of training rules. Secondly, it
investigates the main events which provoked proclamation. This
process of setting down an ethical standard itself emerges from
both an intuitive sense of ethics held by society and the realized
ethics of the Buddha. Further, though the proclamation of the
227 vows is designed to restrain physical and verbal action,
the underlying purpose of the vows is to control the mind’s
motivating unethical action. This survey will show that of the
three roots of ignorance, aversion, and attachment, the vows are
primarily directed to eliminating the root of attachment.
The Buddha’s declaration of ethical rules was seen as one of his two fundamental
responsibilities. He states in the Suttavibhaṅga: “The enlightened ones, the
lords, question the monks concerning two matters, either ‘Shall we teach
dhamma?’ or ‘Shall we declare the course of training for the disciples?’”1 In
proclaiming training rules, the Buddha not only delineated the basic modes of
behavior that facilitate the attainment of the transcendent state, but he also
defined how the lay and ordained may interact ethically within society. This
process is not simply the imposition of an ethical code by ecclesiastic edict; it
evinces a twofold process that has as much to do with social action as religious
innovation. As such the rules demonstrate the inductive tendency of
society to intuitively reject various types of action and the complementary
deductive tendency of the Buddha to deduce, from the general principle
of nibbāna, modes of behavior that conform to nibbāna and lead to
nibbāna.
In this study I shall focus on the record of ethical jurisprudence covering the
proclamation of the 227 rules for monks within the Theravāda tradition and the
general trends that explain the structure and function of the vows. This process
of ethical proclamation reflects the relationship between the laity and the
ordained, and the social tension surrounding the idea of the sacred and how
it should be represented. This process is revealed in the discourses on
discipline (Vinaya-piṭaka), which present a diverse field of phenomenological
data recorded in the centuries after the passing of the Buddha. They
are accounts of religious jurisprudence that not only form the basis of a
descriptive phenomenology but also bear the mark of different layers of
interpretation. Because this material forms the basis of this investigation, its
historicity and the conditions surrounding its accumulation require some
examination.
A Survey of the Textual Sources
The rules of ethical training have been recorded and preserved in the four texts
of the Vinaya-piṭaka, namely the Suttavibhaṅga, Mahāvagga, Cullavagga, and
Parivāra-pāṭha. The Parivāra-pāṭha is regarded as a later work and
probably the work of a Ceylonese thera.2 The Mahāvagga, consisting of ten
khandhakas, and the Cullavagga, consisting of twelve khandhakas, “give a detailed
and connected account of the admission into the sangha; of the ceremony of the
uposatha; of the annually recurring observances connected with the beginning
and the end of the rainy season; of the principal disciplinary proceedings;
and of miscellaneous details regarding medicine, food, dwelling places,
and daily life of the members of the order.”(VT1: xix) In addition, the
first section of the Mahāvagga gives an account of the Buddha’s life
immediately after his enlightenment, and it details the early development of the
sangha.
In this survey, I shall primarily focus on the Suttavibhaṅga, which deals with
the proclamation of the ethical code and the analysis of pāṭimokkha(VT1:xv)
found at the very core of the text.(SV1:xi) The term pāṭimokkha itself refers
both to freeing oneself from saṃsāra3 and to the standard list of 227 training
rules. The training rules are divided in two parts, which indicate two levels of
ethical severity. The first part deals with the four defeats (pārājika),
the thirteen remainders (saṅghādisesa), and two indeterminate cases
(aniyata-dhammas). The second part deals with the thirty forfeitures
(nissaggiya-pācittiya), the ninety-two expiations (pācittiya), the four
confessions (paṭidesaniya), the seventy-five faults (sekhiya), and the seven
dispute procedures (Adhikaraṇasamatha).
The Suttavibhaṅga, while taking the pāṭimokkha as its central theme,
explains the significance of the vows from four related perspectives:
The incident leading to a training rule being proclaimed
The pāṭimokkha rule, which also reveals the penalty for breaking it
The Padabhājaniya (Old Commentary), which defines the rule word
by word
Further incidents revealing deviations from the rule
This format is generally retained for each rule, though sometimes only the
initial precedent is mentioned without reference to further incidents,
and sometimes the order of the pāṭimokkha and Padabhājaniya is
reversed.(SV1:ix) Rhys Davids and Oldenberg were of the opinion that the
early basis of vinaya, the pāṭimokkha, was initially proclaimed in the
precanonical era, starting during the life of the Buddha (567-487 B.C.); that
within fifty years the Padabhājaniya4 was composed as an interpretive
commentary to the pāṭimokkha;(VT1:xvi) and that by the time of the Second
Council at Vesālī (377 B.C.) the Vibhaṅga and the khandhaka of the
Cullavagga and Mahāvagga had reached their final form.5 Though this
interpretation is disputed,6 there is general agreement on a very early date for
the Suttavibhaṅga.
It is reasonable to conclude that the Buddha himself proclaimed many of the
vows. By his example, the process of ethical proclamation was continued and
completed by the community after the Buddha’s paranibbāna in accordance
with the four mahāpadesa.7 These principles are enumerated in the
Mahāparinibbānasutta,8 and they offer a framework for determining the
authenticity of vinaya rules and acknowledge that the Buddha was not the only
author of ethical precepts. A rule, therefore, may be accepted as genuine if
it is (1) the speech of the Buddha (buddhavacana); (2) a rule framed
by elder and distinguished monks in a particular monastery; (3) a rule
framed by learned bearers of the tradition; or (4) a rule framed by a
learned professor of the canon, if the rule is found to conform to sutta and
vinaya.
Oldenberg dismissed the stories of incidents that provoked ethical
proclamation as inventions made to introduce each vow, but Horner deemed it
unnecessary “to hold such a hard-and-fast rule.”(SV1:xxxiv) Indeed some stories
may in fact be true, especially since both the ethical rules and the stories of
precedents were recorded either during the life of the Buddha or within 100 years
of his passing at a time when events in the life of the Buddha survived as
firsthand accounts in the memories of actual witnesses. If the origin of the stories
is attributed to apologetic tendencies, among the early followers of the
Buddha, aimed at authenticating or enhancing the reputation of the
Order, the question arises as to how stories of theft, fornication, deceit,
and so forth would achieve this goal. It is also clear, as in the case of
Purāna,9 that adding vows to the list of pāṭimokkha was not easy,
even if the particular rule fulfilled the necessary criteria. At any rate,
because fabricated incidents could have been included as commentary to the
pāṭimokkha for a variety of reasons, the question of their origin remains
open.
The process of the induction of rules to the pāṭimokkha was influenced and
determined by local culture, and various practices were adopted and included
within the pāṭimokkha by example from other traditions. As such, many
Buddhist training rules reflect the ethics of earlier sects10 in which major
ethical transgressions where universally proscribed. The Jains had precepts
corresponding to the pārājika rules, as did the common precursors of Jain and
Sakyan mendicants, the saññyāsin or brāhmaṇa ascetics.11 The rains retreat
(vassa) was also common to other sects12 and the tradition of reciting the vows
at full and new moons at the uposatha assemblies was instigated by the Buddha
after King Seniya Bimbisāra criticized the Sakyan bhikkhus for remaining idle at
these times, unlike the members of other sects who engaged in religious
activities.13
That there were conflicting opinions regarding the early lists of vows is
evident in the dissent of Purāna of Dakkināgiri at the First Council. He
disagreed with the noninclusion of seven rules relating to food, but his insistence
on a second rehearsal was rejected.14 By the time of the Second Council, 100
years after the paranibbāna, an intense dispute arose regarding the ten unethical
actions of the Vesālī monks, themselves minor vows. This quarrel
implies the existence of a settled and widely accepted code of rules.15 In
the following centuries, more differences emerged in the presentation of
the rules. The Mahāvibhāṣā, which was composed after the Council
under King Kanishka in around 100 A.D., records details of eighteen
different Buddhist sects that each maintained their own versions of the
vinaya.16 Since that time however, a number of these traditions have been
lost, and today the vinaya records of only seven sects survive in part or
whole.17
These different recensions of the vows are at variance with each other only
over systems of enumeration, a fact most evident in the lists of training
rules (sekhiya-dhammas).18 Their general overall concordance implies a
strong intention to preserve an original settled form. This conservative
trend is evident in the living traditions, which tend to reject any further
change to the rules as counter to their settled definition of the spiritual
path.
The Preconditions for the Proclamation of Vows
It appears that no vows were proclaimed for the first few years after the
Buddha’s enlightenment, and the sangha initially lived without the need for
external restraint. The Mahāvagga relates the early spread of dhamma from the
first turning of the wheel in Saranatha, and indicates that early disciples readily
attained one of the four levels of ariya realization before ordination (sotāpanna,sakadāgāmī, anāgāmī, and arahatta). The ease of attainment of early
disciples is attributed to their accumulation of merit (puñña) in previous lives,
whereas later aspirants who lacked this foundation required greater and more
sustained effort. Those who had attained ariya levels were not prone to
major transgressions of ethics because they had eliminated the dependent
arising of ignorance (avijjāpaṭiccasamuppāda), which acts as the
root of unethical behavior and saṃsāra itself. They were, however,
subject to minor transgressions such as Ānanda, who though a stream
enterer (sotāpanna) was still responsible for the proclamation of two
vows.
Though the early community lived without the proclamation of formal
rules, it cannot be inferred that having no rules of ethical restraint was
best. The Suttavibhaṅga indicates that a detailed and comprehensive
declaration of training rules would help preserve both the sangha and
buddhavacana. The Buddha declares that under the Buddhas Vipassin, Sikhin
and Vessabhu “the Brahma life did not last long because they were…idle in
preaching dhamma in detail to the disciples…the course of training for the
disciples was not made known, the pāṭimokkha was not appointed.
After the disappearance of these enlightened ones, these lords, after the
disappearance of the disciples enlightened under these enlightened ones, those
last disciples of various names, families, social strata, who had gone forth from
various families, caused this Brahma-life rapidly to disappear.…Moreover,
Sāriputta, whoever not devoid of passion, is in a terror of the awe-inspiring
jungle-thicket, and enters the jungle-thicket, as a rule his hair stands on end.
This, Sāriputta, is the cause, reason why…the Brahma-life did not last
long.”(SV1:18)
Here two factors are listed as essential for preserving the religious
life, and they correspond precisely to the two issues the Buddha was
concerned to elucidate: view and ethics. If ethics is not extensively taught,
it is difficult to establish the basis for generating the correct view of
dhamma, in accordance with the progressive development of the three
higher trainings. If dhamma is not extensively taught, it is difficult to
understand the need for ethics and the very nature of dhamma itself.
Without a stable understanding of these two, negative internal and external
conditions will tend to quickly undermine the spiritual life. Aspirants,
therefore, need to train for a long period within a proper training structure
overseen by others adequately trained in ethics and dhamma. Such realized
guides are capable of directly demonstrating the path in accordance with
their realization. For example, paccekabuddhārahants tend to instruct
nonverbally through gestures, whereas sāvakārahants openly instruct
others in accordance with their own unique experience of the transcendent
path.
The relationship between adepts and trainees is capable of producing a
stream of realized students. In time, this circle will be broken through the decline
of the merit (puñña) of trainees that supports and facilitates the continued
presence of realized adepts. Without them, the training structure must be
maintained through the example of senior students who are capable of teaching
the ethical code but who lack transcendent insight. At this point, the training
rules act as a substitute for the instruction of living realized guides and embody
the training structure.
The proclamation of rules was not a spontaneous process. Instead, it
depended on the occurrence of certain external conditions that when
manifest, provided the appropriate context for the Buddha to make a
declaration. The Suttavibhaṅga relates a story where Sāriputta requested the
Buddha to make known the course of training for disciples. When so
requested, the Buddha replied “Wait, Sāriputta, wait, Sāriputta. The
Tathāgata will know the right time for that. The teacher does not make
known, Sāriputta, the course of training for disciples, or appoint the
pāṭimokkha until some conditions causing the cankers to appear here in the
Order.…Some conditions do not…appear…until the Order has attained long
standing…[or]…full development…[or]…the chief greatness of gain…[or]…great
learning.”(SV1:19)
This statement implies that the process of Buddhist ethical injunction is
reactive, not proactive. Ethical rules are imposed to counter the negative actions
of individuals only after they have been committed. The Buddha intervened only
when events demanded redress and the order and society were predisposed to
assimilating a training rule. The Mūlasarvāstivāda tradition asserts that this
process began in the sixth year after enlightenment, not long after the ordination
of Sudinna.19
The Suttavibhaṅga then lists the reasons for the Buddha proclaiming rules of
restraint on the occasion of proclaiming the first defeat (pārājika). “On account
of this, monks, I will make known the course of training for monks, founded on
ten reasons: (1) for the excellence of the Order, (2) for the comfort of
the Order, (3) for the restraint of evil-minded men, (4) for the ease of
well-behaved monks, (5) for the restraint of cankers belonging to the here and
now, (6) for the combating of the cankers belonging to other worlds, (7)
for the benefit of non-believers, (8) for the increase in the number of
believers, (9) for establishing dhamma indeed, (10) for following the rules of
restraint.”(SV1:37)
These ten reasons may be summarized in four categories. Reasons 1, 2, 4 and
10 are directed to establishing positive internal or psychological conditions for the
sangha; reasons 3, 5 and 6 are directed to eliminating negative internal
conditions; reasons 7 and 8 are directed to providing positive external conditions
such as food, daily requisites and so forth; and the reason 9 is directed to
providing positive conditions for the preservation of the Dharma. The last point
deals with the idea that dhamma as transcendent realization is the source of
ethics, and ethics provides, in turn, the support for the continued existence of
dhamma. When the sangha, who constitute the group who formally maintain
ethics within society, no longer exists and there are no ordained beings practicing
restraint of the four pārājika, then dhamma will disappear as a living cultural
tradition.
The Relative Severity of the Vows
The vows do not carry equal weight, but are classified in seven divisions of
sikkhāpada in order of declining severity. This seven-fold division may have
existed in some form at the time the vows themselves were proclaimed as an
essential aspect of the description of the vow. However, the ordering of the vows
in seven divisions of declining severity is certainly the work of later editors.
In terms of relative severity, the vows may be divided into major and
minor vows. The range of major vows may therefore include the defeats,
remainders, and indefinite cases. The range of the minor vows would include
forfeitures, expiations, confessions, training rules, and dispute procedures.
The Cullavagga describes a discussion by elders to determine the minor
vows. This discussion occurred after the death of the Buddha, when
Ānanda informed the Order that the Buddha gave permission for the
minor vows to be abolished after his death.20 The Cullavagga relates
that there was general disagreement as to which of the seven divisions
were minor vows. Finally, Kassapa proposed that all vows be retained to
prevent the laity from accusing the Order of backsliding after the Buddha’s
paranibbāna, which demonstrates the pervasive influence of lay opinion on the
Order.
Secondly, with regard to the major vows the measure of absolute severity is
the defeat (pārājika).21 One who is defeated is likened to a “man with his head
cut off [who] cannot become one to live with that bodily connection…[he] is not a
true recluse.”(SV1:48) The offence cannot be purified, just as a severed head
cannot be reattached to the torso. The offender is no longer in communion, where
communion means “one work, one rule, an equal training.”(SV1:48) Defeat,
therefore, is the measure of absolute severity for there is no possibility of
purifying a transgression.22
The next level is the remainder (saṅghādisesa)23, or formal meeting
(SV1:xxx). Remainders are offences which require a formal meeting of the sangha
where “The Order places (the offender) on probation on account of the offence, it
sends him back to the beginning, it inflicts the mānatta discipline, it
rehabilitates.”(SV1:196) By submitting to the penalty imposed by the formal
meeting of the sangha, the offence is purified.
The two indefinite cases (aniyata dhammas) are called indefinite because they
are “not determined as to whether [they] involve defeat, or formal meeting of the
Order, or expiation.”(SV1:335) Therefore, these two are effectively subsumed
within the divisions of defeat, remainder, or expiation.
Next in severity are the two divisions of expiation (pācittiyam). The first are
the thirty forfeitures (nissaggiya)24 described in the Vibhaṅga as “āpattidesabbā”(SV2:xxv), which implies forfeiture of the offending article plus
confession. Here an article is deemed unsuitable for an ordainee practicing the life
of a mendicant either by its very nature or by its size or quantity. The Vibhaṅga
briefly describes the procedure for purifying the offence in regard to the first
forfeiture: “Having forfeited it, the offence should be confessed. The offence
should be acknowledged by an experienced competent monk; the robe forfeited
should be given back.”(SV2:8) This procedure is common to all cases of
forfeiture.
The second division is the ninety-two expiations (pācittiyam). Horner asserts
them to be confessions unaccompanied by forfeiture(SV2:xxv), and they deal
with a variety of offences related to the daily activities of mendicants that
required purification through repentance. The four confessions (paṭidesaniya)25
deal with improperly soliciting and distributing alms. The next division is the
seventy-five training rules (sekhiya-dhamma), which are the same for both monks
and nuns and which set out appropriate modes of behavior for travel, eating,
teaching dhamma, relieving oneself, and so on. The final division, the seven
dispute procedures (adhikaraṇa), set out the proper means for dealing with
dispute in the order.
In summary, the seven dispute procedures and the seventy-five training rules
are guidelines for quelling dispute and for proper modes of etiquette, respectively.
Their transgression requires no formal purification. The four confessions are
purified through their individual confession. The thirty forfeitures plus the
ninety-two expiations are purified, respectively, through confession conjoined
with or without forfeiture. The two indefinite cases are subsumed in the three
divisions of defeat, remainder, and expiation. The remainders are purified
through a formal meeting of the sangha and the imposition of appropriate
penalties. The defeats cannot be purified.
Traditionally, the seven levels of vows are regarded as progressive layers
of defense against the intrusion of afflictive mental states (kilesa) that
would destroy renunciation and the life of a recluse. These rules are like
concentric circles of levy banks that restrain the fourfold flood (ogha) of desire
(kāma), existence (bhava), view (diṭṭhi), and ignorance (avijjā). Minor
offences are like the failure of the outer levies, which expose the inner walls
to erosion. Just as the outer walls of a levy system can be repaired, so
too remedial measures, such as confession, can reestablish the minor
vows and restore their protective function. However, if the minor vows
are not maintained, the danger of a complete loss of the ethical basis
increases.
Both defeats and remainders also possess internal degrees of severity, such
as full offence, grave offence (thullaccaya), and wrongdoing (dukkata).
Although a full offence cannot be purified for a defeat, a grave offence and
wrong doing can be purified by the appropriate remedial action. A grave
offence may signify the absence of a factor required for a full and actual
offence, whereas a wrongdoing signifies the absence of more than one
essential factor. For instance, if a person intent on stealing an object of
sufficient value touches that object in the process of stealing it, it is a
wrongdoing. If he moves it, it becomes a grave offence. If he removes it
completely from its original place, it becomes a defeat.(SV1:70) Conversely,
grave offence and wrongdoing may indicate degree in a single factor.
For instance, the theft of an object of greater value than five māsaka
entails defeat, four māsaka entails a grave offence, and one māsaka a
wrongdoing.(SV1:xxiī)
A Survey of the Events Initiating the Proclamation of Training Rules
The stories in the Suttavibhaṅga present a broad and often detailed picture
of the lives of ordinary people in early Indian society. They place the
ethical dilemmas that the Buddha adjudicated within their appropriate
social context and put a human face to the dry enumeration of rules.
These disputes center on how the religious life should be lived, both
within the circle of ordained sangha and in relation to the wider lay
community.
Many vows were defined and clarified by a series of precedents. The first
precedent in particular, introduced the nature and type of action which was
being censured. Later precedents sharpened the definition and eliminated doubt
and ambiguity.
The stories precede the declaration of a rule, and generally start by
locating the place of residence of the Buddha. The Suttavibhaṅga lists just
seven general locations where offences occurred: Vesālī, Rājagaha,
Sāvatthī, Kosambī, Ālavī, Kapilavatthu, and Bhagga. Three of
the four defeats were proclaimed in or near Vesālī, which reflects its
reputation as a center for intellectual dissent. It was also the site of the
dispute in the order over the ten unvinayic actions, which led to the
convening of the Second Council. The vast majority of the remaining
vows were proclaimed in Sāvatthī, while the Buddha was resident
at Anāthapindika’s park in Jeta’s Grove, a site where he spent many
rains.
With regard to the offenders, there were twenty-two different agents listed as
precedent setters. The category of monks include the monks at ālavī, the
followers of Mettiya and Bhummika, the followers of Assaji and Punnabasu, as
well as wandering monks. The four defeats were committed by different
individual monks not recorded to have offended again. Because they were
precedent setters, their offence did not lead to their expulsion from the order.
The remaining vows were often proclaimed through the actions of repeat
offenders. Udāyin set precedents for the proclamation of four remainders
and influencing a fifth, both indefinite cases, four forfeitures and four
expiations, all related to sexual activity. Upananda set precedents for
eight forfeitures all related to the improper acquisition of robes and eight
expiations related to different offences. By far the most prominent were
the Group of Six (chabbagiyas), six monks who set precedents in 126
cases.
There are a variety of complainants mentioned in the Suttavibhaṅga whose
criticism led to the proclamation of a rule. Two nonhuman complainants are
mentioned, a deva for the first defeat and a devatā for the expiation concerning
the cutting down of a tree (5/11)26 The Buddha acted as complainant in nine
cases. Ordainees acted as complainants in seventy-eight instances, of which six
involved nuns. In general, the ordained were more prominent as complainants in
the five most serious divisions of vows. The laity were more active in
the minor vows, acting as complainants in 129 cases, seventy related to
etiquette.
Although the laity formally took a minor role in religious activities, it is clear
they were influential during the period of the formation of the rules. The laity
held strong opinions concerning what recluses could or should do, because they
formed the economic support of the mendicants. By freeing them from the
harvest and other economic activities, they granted the ordained sangha a
privileged social position. However, their recognition of this status depended on
the way the mendicants behaved and whether they properly represented the
religious ideal held by society. In return for economic support, the laity
were seen to benefit by their accumulation of merit (puñña). However,
the theory of merit depended on the actual ethical status of the sangha
in relation to whom merit was accumulated. Therefore, the laity had
a vested interest in the sangha maintaining high religious and social
standards.
A Brief Analysis of the Precedents
The defeats were the measure of absolute ethical severity. Transgression is the
defeat of an individual’s life as a recluse where one is expelled and no longer in
communion. The Suttavibhaṅga describes the circumstances leading to the first
defeat concerning sexual activity (1/1). Sudinna had received novice (pabbajjā)
and full-ordination (upasaṃpadā) and dwelt on alms near a village of the
Vajjians. A famine occurred and he returned to Vesālī, his parents’
neighborhood, where food was plentiful. His parents attempted to entice him to
resume lay life with his former wife and employ the extensive family
wealth for meritorious action. He declined, but when urged to produce an
heir to stop the Licchavi from taking over their property, he relented
and engaged in intercourse with his former wife three times, and she
conceived a son. The devā loudly proclaimed this immoral act. In time,
Sudinna’s former wife gave birth to a son and, Sudinna suffered acute
remorse.(SV1:23-33)
Here the agent Sudinna acts through both family pressure and sexual
attachment, both of which are renounced by the bhikkhu and form essential
elements in the definition of a recluse. The Mahāvagga relates the story of the
Buddha’s reunion with the five bhikkhus at Isipatana. The Buddha exhorts them
to realize “here and now by your own super-knowledge that supreme goal of
the Brahma-faring for the sake of which young men of family rightly go
forth from home into homelessness.”27 A recluse, therefore, is one who
renounces all family concerns and leads a celibate life to realize the goal of
dhamma.
Sudinna’s breaking of celibacy (abrahmacariya) marks an ethical crisis and
the breaking of a sacred trust. The goal of nibbāna demanded ethical purity.
Loss of this purity marked the fall of an individual and discredit to the order.
Here, the Buddha outlined two basic results, one concerning the offender and the
other the lay community, a convention maintained for each of the four defeats.
For the first result, the Buddha stated “It is not fit…not becoming…not
proper…unworthy of a recluse. Is not dhamma taught by me for the sake of
passionlessness…the waning of passion…the destruction of pleasures of the
senses…the allaying of the fever of the pleasures of the senses?…after death you
would pass to the waste, the bad bourn, the abyss, hell.”(SV1:36) The recluse
Sudinna, by his action, had destroyed the foundation of his practice as a
recluse.
Although the consequence of defeat for an individual is expulsion from the
order, spiritual development is still possible if the action was purified. The
Theravāda tradition does not, however, permit readmission to full ordination.
On the other hand, the Mūlasarvāstivāda tradition asserts expulsion is not
necessary if the agent had no intention to conceal the offence from the moment
the offence was committed, and the offender undertakes prescribed measures for
purification. The Mūlasarvāstivāda assert that the offending monk remains
an ordainee for four reasons: (1) an offender may act as the agent of further
offences; (2) he may act as the ordained object of denigration by other monks;
(3) such an offender can break in order all four defeats; and (4) when such an
offender attains the state of arahant they can again assume their rank in the
assembly.28
Secondly, the Buddha declared the public result: “It is not…for the benefit of
non-believers, nor for the increase in the number of believers, but it is…to the
detriment of both non-believers and believers, and it causes wavering in
some.”(SV1:37) This is the more serious and pervasive result. It potentially
affected the entire order, creating doubt for those with sympathy for the
Buddha’s dispensation and adding fuel to those not in favor of it. By bringing the
order into disrepute, Sakyan mendicants could expect alms and requisites to be
more difficult to acquire in a society where many different sects competed for
respect and resources. Serious loss of public confidence could inhibit the growth
of a new religious order or even destroy it. The measure adopted by the
Buddha to restore confidence was to strongly and publicly chastise the
offender and make known that any future offender would be expelled.
Further, the fact that the initial precedent does not require expulsion
of the offender also implies that the proclamation is as much directed
to the reputation of the order for breakage of the vows and does not
automatically disqualify someone from formal recognition as a Buddhist
contemplative.
The initial precedent concerning the second defeat(SV1:64-72) of
stealing(1/2) occurred on the Isigili mountain-slope above Rājagaha. The
recluse Dhaniya tried to construct a hermit’s hut of grass and wood, but
each time women dismantled it and carried away the wood. He built
and fired a clay hut, which the Buddha ordered destroyed because its
construction harmed insects. Then, claiming the king had given him
wood to construct a hut, Dhaniya requested the overseer of the king’s
timber yard to give him the king’s timber that had been set aside for
repair of the city. Having obtained the wood, he constructed a hut but
was later arrested along with the overseer. Dhaniya confessed his act to
the king and the person who freed him because he was a monk. The
people became angry with Dhaniya’s release, and in response the Buddha
proclaimed a training rule by stating, “Whatever monk should by means of
theft take from a village or from the jungle what has not been given to
him in such a manner of taking as kings, catching a thief in the act of
stealing, would flog him or imprison him or banish him, saying, ‘You are a
robber, you are foolish, you are wrong, you are a thief’, even so a monk,
taking what is not given him, is also one who is defeated, he is not in
communion.”(SV1:71)
Dhaniya had great trouble building himself a hut, and at each turn his plans
were frustrated. When, however, he falsely claimed that the king’s wood
had been given to him and took that wood away, he had committed
theft. Dhaniya had destroyed the foundation of the life of a recluse by
committing an illegal act. Although the recluse renounces worldly concerns, the
special status granted by society demands his strict adherence to legality.
Again the Buddha had to strongly chastise the offender to regain public
confidence.
The third defeat is killing a human(1/3). The Buddha at Vesālī spoke in
praise of contemplating the impure nature of the body, then he entered
solitary retreat for two weeks. Applying this technique, the bhikkhus soon
realized the nature of their physical impurity and became ashamed and
depressed. They requested Migalaṇḍika to kill them, and he agreed to assist
them by slitting their throats, receiving in turn their robes and bowls. He
then became repentant, but, deceived by a deva into thinking his acts
were meritorious, he proceeded to kill other monks. The Buddha, on
finishing his retreat, questioned Ānanda about the lack of monks, who
revealed the situation. The Buddha then proclaimed the defeat of killing.
“Whatever monk should intentionally deprive a human of life or should look
about so as to be his knife bringer, he is one who is defeated, he is not in
communion.”(SV1:116-123)
The act of killing is both illegal and counter to the notion of recluse. The
Buddha proscribed killing since it directly opposes ethics: the act of not harming
either oneself or others. The act of taking life, whether through murder, suicide,
abortion, euthanasia, and so on, is regarded as a natural nonvirtue, because it is
nonvirtuous regardless of the context or motivation. In other words, the
motivation to kill is always a harmful motivation, but such a negative motivation
can be associated with other positive motivations. For example in an act of
euthanasia, the motivation to kill is nonvirtuous, the motivation to free another
of suffering virtuous, and choosing the wrong method to end suffering a
product of ignorance. In other words, killing another in order to end their
suffering, even when motivated by compassion, may actually increase their
suffering if it inadvertently creates the conditions for rebirth in states of
greater suffering. Also, abortion is regarded as murder because a fetus
is regarded as a fully qualified human being from the first moment of
conception. This is evident in the presentation of the twelve links of dependent
arising (paṭiccasamuppāda), where the fourth link of name and form
represents the first moment of the complete basis for designation as a human
being.
The first three defeats also correspond to discipline (sīla) held by the Jain
and saññyāsin recluses (SV1:xxiv) and reflect a shared societal view of the
behavioral limits of a mendicant. However, the fourth defeat is not shared by
other traditions. It concerns a mendicant lying (1/4) about the attainment of
mundane and transcendent meditative states.(SV1:159) Though a detailed
knowledge of the philosophic implications of meditative attainments would not be
common in society in general, claims to ariya status would be recognized, just as
claims to the status of a saint would be broadly understood in Christian
society.
The initial precedent occurred during a famine in Vajji when in order to gain
alms some monks spoke in praise of having attained superhuman states when
they had not actually attained those levels. At the end of the rains, they visited
the Buddha who questioned them or their robust health at a time of scarce
resources. They admitted their offence and the Buddha proclaimed the defeat of
lying.(SV1:151) A recluse who gains alms in this way is the worst type of thief, or
as the Buddha states “the chief great thief,”(SV1:157) for here public
religious sympathy was manipulated for alms at a time of general social
hardship.
The attainments that are the objects of the lie refer to both sublime states
(mahagatta) such as the jhānas, and transcendent states (lokuttara) such as the
ariya, truths of the path (magga-sacca), and cessation (nirodha-sacca). By falsely
claiming to have surpassed the status of an ordinary human and convincing
others of it, a bhikkhu is defeated. Further, bhikkhus or bhikkunīs who have
attained such states and reveal this attainment others without adequate cause
incur the offence of expiation(5/9).
It is clear that the vows against the four defeats are the final defense of the
ordained, and when a complete infraction occurs one is defeated and no longer in
communion. The thirteen remainders act as a second line of defense and prevent
an ordained being from entering states preparatory to defeats. Committing any
of the first five remainders clearly enhance sexual attachment and predispose a
bhikkhu to breaking brahmacariya.
The generation of sexual attachment was identified by the Buddha as the
main obstacle to renunciation and the most difficult passion for a human to
renounce. All five precedents were proclaimed with reference to the actions of the
lascivious Udāyin. In the first incident he recommended masturbation to
another monk as a way of relieving sexual tension(2/1). In the second, he touched
the body of a married woman in his cell(2/2). In the third, he spoke lewd words
to females in his cell(2/3). In the fourth, he requested sex from a female,(2/4)
and in the fifth he acted as matchmaker(2/5).
The implications of the sixth and seventh remainders are less clear. The
initial proclamation regarding the improper construction of meditation huts
(kuti)(2/6) clearly rebukes monks for harassing the lay community to give
building materials for constructing large individual dwellings. Further
proclamations reinforce this interpretation and stress that excessive begging ruins
the mendicants’ relationship with their patrons. It would be improper use of a
patron’s resources to commence construction without first ensuring full
sponsorship of the work. The incident resembles the precedent for declaring the
defeat of theft. It implies that this remainder is a potential preparation for theft.
Improper construction of a monastery (vihāra)(2/7) was proscribed since
Channa, while dwelling at Kosambī, cut down a tree used as a shrine in
order to build a vihāra. The local people were angry that a monk could
commit such an act of destruction to a revered site, and the Buddha
declared that because sentient beings inhabited the tree it should not have
been destroyed. A site for a vihāra, therefore, must be an open space,
properly marked, involve no destruction, and so forth. The proclamation of
this remainder emphasizes the prevention of harming or killing sentient
beings. Disregard of this remainder would potentially lead to the defeat of
killing.
Baseless accusation(2/8) was proscribed when Dabba, while dwelling at the
Bamboo Grove, was appointed to assign lodgings. He was denigrated by the
ordained followers of Mettiya and Bhummajaka, who falsely accused him of
committing a defeat. Both this and the remainder of implying(2/9) involve deceit
and lying about the defeat of another. Although they do not directly lead to
defeat, because they are serious instances of deceit they create predispositions to
lying about one’s attainments, the fourth defeat. Dividing the sangha(2/10) was
proscribed when Devadatta, while living at the Bamboo Grove, requested the
implementation of the five ascetic practices, which the Buddha had rejected.
Devadatta and his supporters then denigrated orthodox monks and their
practices, persisted in this divisive course, and finally withdrew from the sangha,
creating a schism. Although creating a schism is regarded as one of the
five heinous acts (ānantarika-dhamma), it is not included within the
defeats along with the heinous acts of killing one’s mother, father, or
an arahant. Instead. creating a schism is designated a remainder while
spilling the blood of a Buddha is not included in the training rules. That a
schism is designated a remainder is indicative of the freedom granted
to the order to dissent and even split from the main body of monks.
Informally, this designation recognizes legitimate reasons for forming new
sects.
Discontent with advice(2/12) was proscribed when Channa in Kosambī
rejected the advice of monks who criticized his bad habits. He persisted in this
course and, after the third warning, a remainder was declared. His fault was to
reject the valid advice of learned monks directed to eliminating his faults, the
very purpose for him undertaking such training. Rejecting their advice is
tantamount to rejecting the advice of the Buddha himself, and draws comparison
with the motivation for schism where also valid advice is rejected. The
remainder of not spoiling the faith of the laity(2/13) was declared when the
followers of Assaji and Punabbasu indulged in various bad habits in
Kitāgiri. Lay followers who supported them were corrupted and failed to
support virtuous monks, yet the offenders persisted in this course of action
even when warned. The precedent resembles the previous remainder,
yet here a monk’s bad habits involves the corruption of householders
and the misuse of donor resources. It is the potential preparation for
theft.
Whereas the defeats indicate individual instances of interaction between the
lay and ordained, the remainders more clearly reflect the development of a
religious communal structure. Here, the first rules governing shelters (āvāsa),
huts (kuti), and monasteries (ārāma; vihāra) were codified. They provide a
foundation for the emergence of the settled patterns of monastic life
exemplified by the rites of ordination (pabbajjā; upasaṃpadā), rains
(vassa), and the pavāraṇā and kathina rituals at the end of the rains
retreat.
The two indefinite cases involve standing(3/1) and sitting(3/2) in seclusion
with a female and involve potential preparation for the first five remainders and
the first defeat. In contrast, the next division of vows, the thirty forfeitures,
involve the wrong acquisition of articles, and their purification requires that the
article be forfeited. The forfeitures are less serious than the thirteen remainders.
Two forfeitures, not to have a robe washed or dyed by a bhikkhunī who is not a
relative(4/5) and not to accept a robe from a bhikkhunī who is not a
relative,(4/5) are related to sexual attachment and prevent potential
preparatory states to the first five remainders. Twenty-eight forfeitures
involve improper use of donor resources and potentially relate to three
remainders.(2/6-7,13)29 From among those, eighteen involve robes, robe funds, or
cloth or yarn for making robes. Seven involve rugs, or silk or wool for making
rugs. Two involve bowls, one involves medicine, and two are related to
gold and silver. Fourteen complainants are ordainees and sixteen lay,
including the actual donors. The forfeitures indicate the existence of a
sophisticated culture of mendicancy and strong expectations of both the
mendicants and laity of the donor-mendicant relationship. These vows
proscribe ordainee’s misuse of donor resources, and they check any drift to
attachment to worldly goods. Further, they prevent monks from engaging
in financial activity, which is the exclusive and legitimate field of the
laity.
The ninety-two expiations are regarded as equal in weight to the
forfeitures, and they contain a wide variety of offences, each purified by
confession. In brief, sixty-four expiations proscribe physical actions and
twenty-nine verbal actions. Again, nine refer to robes or requisites, four
deal with incorrect measurement,(5/89-92)30 and two involve giving an
unrelated nun robes or robe material.(5/25-26)31 That these did not require
forfeiture reflects the difficulty nuns faced in gaining requisites and the fact
that forfeiture would punish the nun, not the offender. Three involve the
misuse of robes: not marking robes for identification,(5/58)32 using other’s
robes without permission, (5/59)33 or hiding other’s robes.(5/60)34 Such
misuse of robes is not as serious as storing robes for more than six nights
in the jungle and potentially ruining them(4/29) and did not require
forfeiture. Similarly, wearing a robe the size of the Buddha (5/92)35 did not
require forfeiture, and the Suttavibhaṅga notes there is no offence if the
offender “makes it less…having cut it down, he makes use of it;…makes
a canopy.”36 Thirteen expiations relate to improper ways of begging
and eating alms(5/29,31-42) and are generally related to the misuse of
donor resources. The Group of Six figure in forty-one precedents, which
occurred mainly in Sāvatthī. UpĀnanda figures in eight, also mainly in
Sāvatthī. In summary, nineteen expiations potentially lead to sexual
activity, twenty-five to theft, fifteen to killing, ten to lying, and twelve to
slander.
The four confessions are concerned with improperly begging and distributing
alms. Two are related to bhikkhunīs: not accepting food from a bhikkhunī
(6/1) or ordering bhikkhunīs to leave a meal(6/2). Two are related the
method of accepting food: either not to beg alms from impoverished
donors(6/3) or not soliciting and eating alms in a place of danger to the donor.
Three of the four were committed by the Group of Six. In summary, the
confessions relate to the etiquette of soliciting alms, and committing them
potentially leads to transgressing expiations or more serious offences of similar
type.
The seventy-five training rules relate to the etiquette of travel, food, teaching
and relieving oneself. For seventy-two rules, the agents are the Group of Six
committed at Sāvatthī and the complainants are the general public. The
thirty rules pertaining to food may be regarded as improper use of donor
resources. The rest appear to be mainly motivated by ignorance and
inattentiveness, and they potentially lead to any of the seven negative actions of
body and speech. Training rules do not require confession for purification,
and they function as behavioral guidelines. Thirty guidelines related to
food are marginally less serious than the confessions, which all relate to
food.
Conclusion
We can infer from this brief analysis that the Buddha formulated the 227 vows to
prohibit verbal37 and physical38 actions that obstruct entry to the path. The
vows, therefore, reveal the deeper purpose of countering the generation of the
three negative motivating roots (hetu): attachment (lobha), aversion (dosa), and
delusion (moha). Though the seven negative verbal and physical actions can be
motivated by any of the three roots separately or in combination, from the
perspective of the dominant motivation, attachment is foremost in both sexual
misconduct and theft, aversion is foremost in killing, ignorance is foremost in
lying, and so on. In this light, attachment has provoked the proclamation of as
many as 110 vows, where twenty-nine are related to sex and eighty-one to
theft. Aversion had provoked thirty-three vows, sixteen for killing, fifteen
for slander, and two for harsh words. Ignorance has motivated as many
as twenty-seven vows related to lying and so on, and as few as one for
gossip.
It is evident that attachment directly initiated many more ethical
proclamations than aversion or ignorance. Attachment to sexual activity
provoked the Buddha’s proclamation of the first defeat and the first five
remainders. This suggests that sexual attachment is the strongest obstacle for an
ordainee. Attachment to other’s possessions provoked the Buddha’s proclamation
of the second defeat and the sixth and seventh remainders, and signifies a
potentially less destructive but more common type of attachment. That vows
related to sex and theft were first proclaimed by the Buddha reflects the
importance he placed on eliminating attachment (lobha). In contrast, the Jain
presentation of sīla, which contains precepts equivalent to the first three
defeats, lists killing as the first precept, which reflects the importance Jains
placed on ahiṃsā.39
The destructive function of attachment is also evident in the presentation of
the twelve links of dependent arising (paṭiccasamuppāda), where attachment is
represented by the eighth link of craving (taṇhā) and the ninth link of grasping
(upādāna) as essential elements in the causal process of saṃsāra. We must,
therefore, conclude that the prime significance of the vows for the individual was
to lessen and eliminate attachment. Although ignorance (avijjā) or delusion
(moha) acts as the root of saṃsāra in accordance with the presentation of the
twelve links, ignorance remains a secondary object of elimination within
pāṭimokkha.
Abbreviations
CV5 Cullavagga: Book of the Discipline, Vol. 5 (I.B. Horner)
GMV The General Meaning of Vinaya (Jetsun Chokyi Gyaltsen)
MV4 Mahāvagga: Book of the Discipline, Vol. 4 (I.B. Horner)
SV1 Suttavibhaṅga: Book of the Discipline, Vol. 1 (I.B. Horner)
SV2 Suttavibhaṅga: Book of the Discipline, Vol. 2 (I.B. Horner)
SV3 Suttavibhaṅga: Book of the Discipline, Vol. 3 (I.B. Horner)
3The Pāli pāṭimokkha or the Sanskrit prātimokṣa consists of the two
components: prāti + mokṣa where the prefix prati indicates “towards”
or “‘near” and mokṣa is derived from moks the desiderative form of muc:
“to liberate,” “to free.” The term therefore implies liberation or deliverance.
See A Sanskrit English Dictionary by Monier-Williams p. 669. Also see Holt
page 35. Rhys Davids and Oldenberg suggest “disburdening, getting free”
Rhys Davids, T.W. & Oldenberg, H., Vinaya Texts, parts 1, p. xī.
4The ‘Old Commentary’ no longer exists as a separate work but is contained
word for word within the Vinaya-piṭaka.
5(VT1:xviī) He states, “The Vibhaṇga and the Twenty Khandhakas were
at (the time of the Council of Vesālī) (circa 350 BC) already held in
such high repute that no one ventured to alter them; a sanctity of this kind
is not required without the lapse of a considerable time…these books must
have been in existence, as we now have them, within thirty years, earlier or
later of, at least, 360 or 370 BC…the Old Commentary they have preserved
must be considerably, perhaps fifty years, older…the Kammavādās and the
Pātimokkha must be older still.”
6It is conceivable that the pātimokkha was composed as a summary or
commentary to the khandhaka, but a lack of supportive evidence does not
favor this conclusion. See Holt, p. 36.
10Pachow asserts the influence of the pa ncasīla on the formation of the
Buddhist ethical code, according to Horner, in I.B. Horner, Suttavibhaṅga:Book of the Discipline, Vol. 1, p. xxiī. (SV1:xxiī)
11Jacobi, Jaina Sutras, I, in I.B. Horner, Suttavibhaṅga: Book of theDiscipline, Vol. 1, p. xxiī.
12“This custom was certainly not distinct to the Buddhists, but rather was
observed by many sects within the parivrājaka community, e.g. the Jainas
and Brāmanical Sa n nyāsins.” C. Prebish, Buddhist Monastic Discipline
p. 4.
13I.B.Horner, (Transl.) Mahāvagga: Book of the Discipline Volume 4, p.131.
(MV4)
16K.C. Chaudhuri, History of Ancient India, p.228.
17Nanjio lists the vinaya literature of 7 schools in his Catalogue of the Chinesetranslations of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka, in G.S.P. Misra, The Age of Vinaya,
p. 3.
18The Theravāda assert seventy-five vows, while the Sarvāstivāda assert
112 vows.
19The Mūlasarvāstivāda tradition asserts that the first instance of
ordination by a formal ceremony was conducted by Sāriputra who acted
as abbot and ordained Sudinna (’char ka) six years after the Buddha’s
enlightenment. As Sudinna committed the first defeat not long after his
ordination, it is assumed that the proclamation of the first defeat occurred
six years after the Buddha’s enlightenment. See Jetsun Chokyi Gyaltsen,
The General Meaning of Vinaya, p. 44. (GMV:44)
20I.B. Horner, Cullavagga: Book of the Discipline, Vol. 5, p. 398. (CV5)
21(SV1:xxvi) Horner translates pārājika as defeat.
22 In the Mūlasarvāstivāda tradition defeats committed without intention
to conceal may be purified by appropriate confession and purification.
23Jetsun Chokyi Gyaltsen (rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mtshan) suggests an
explanation of the etymology of the term. The offence does not completely
eliminate the vow, a remnant of the vow survives that may be purified
through a meeting of the sangha and imposition, acceptance and completion
of a penalty.
24I.B. Horner, Suttavibhaṅga: Book of the Discipline, Vol. 2, p. 7. (SV2)
25I.B. Horner, Suttavibhaṅga: Book of the Discipline, Vol. 3, p. 103. (SV3)
26To assist in the identification of individual vows, each vow has been assigned
two numbers in brackets. The first number refers to the division of vows
from among the seven fold division of vows that the particular rule belongs
to, and the second number refers to the specific number of the vow in that
division.
27I.B. Horner Mahāvagga: Book of the Discipline, Vol. 4, p. 13. (MV4)
28The Mūlasarvāstivāda tradition here classifies two types of offence,
concealed and unconcealed defeat. The first involves the deliberate
concealment of a defeat once committed and cannot be purified. The second
involves no concealment and can be purified. See Jetsun Chokyi Gyaltsen,
The General Meaning of Vinaya, p. 220. (GMV)
29(2/6) Not to build a dwelling with dimensions exceeding 2.70 by 1.60 meters
or less than that required for normal movement, without permission from
sangha and/or harming living beings in the process; (2/7) Not to build a
monastery without the approval of the sangha, harming living beings in the
process, or with dimensions less than that required for normal movement;
(2/13) Not to harm the faith or regard that laity have for the dhamma.
30(5/89) Not to use a cloth mat exceeding 2.20 by 1.72 meters with a border
exceeding 1.15 meters; (5/90) Not to make or have a rash cloth exceeding
4.50 by 2.20 meters; (5/91) Not to make or have made a rains robe exceeding
6.50 by 2.70 meters; (5/92) Not to make or have made a robe exceeding 10
by 6.50 meters
31(5/25) Not to give robes to a bhikkunī; (5/26) Not to make a robe for a
bhikkunī
32(5/58) Not to use a robe without first discoloring it with maroon, brown, or
black marks
33(5/59) Not to wear a robe shared with a bhikkhu, a bhikkunī, a sikkhamāna,
a sāmaṇera or a sāmaṇerī, without the latter having pronounced in
turn the formula for sharing this robe
34(5/60) Not to conceal or hide the property of another bhikkhu
35(5/92) Not to make or have made a robe exceeding 10 by 6.50 meters.
36I.B. Horner, Suttavibhaṅga: Book of the Discipline, Vol. 3, p. 101. (SV3:101)
37The four negative verbal actions: Lying (mūsāvāda), slander
(pisunavācā), harsh speech (pharusavācā) and gossip (sampapphalāpa)
38The three negative physical actions: Killing (pānātipāta), stealing
(adinnādāna) and sexual misconduct (kāmesu-micchācāra)
39I.B. Horner, Suttavibhaṅga: Book of the Discipline, Vol. 1, p. xxiv.
(SV1:xxiv)
