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Emeritus Professor of Oriental Laws
School of Oriental and African Studies
University of London
Preamble
The four
components of micchā-vācā (“wrong speech”)[2]—that
is lies (specifically “conscious lying”), vulgar abuse, backbiting, and idle
chatter—can hardly ever have hindered the average talker. However, “A liar
should have a good memory” (a maxim used by Quintilian). The Cretans were famous
for lying (Titus 1:12) and the Parthians were champion liars (Horace, Epistle
2.1, 112). The Old Israel was, we are told complacently, well equipped with
lies, and proud of it.[3]
People who are lacking independence will find lying essential. Malicious
comments, too, find ready ears (Horace, Satires 1.3, 38-75). Modern “soaps”
present characters of all ages lying imaginatively and with verve. Early
Christians developed the virtue of truthfulness on slender authority, for so
had their Jewish background.[4]
Judeo-Christianity presented “false accusation” as a malady (Luke 19:8; 2
Timothy 3:3; Titus 2:3) and how to punish false witnesses preoccupied their
predecessors (Deuteronomy 19:16, 18; Psalms 7:12, 35:11; Temple Scroll
61:7-11). We may compare the Vinaya’s rich material on “wrong speech”
with the meager Jewish halakhic (traditional normative) and sectarian
material on the same subject, for if they are of equal antiquity they are quite
dissimilar, and each may throw light on the other.[5]
A key is to be found in “privileged lies,” present in Judaism, Christianity, and
even more significantly in Hinduism, but totally missing from Buddhism.
A privileged lie cannot exist where (1) lies are totally
forbidden, or (2) lying is so common that no excuse for it is expected. A lie
is “privileged” where it is commonly excused, granted that lying in general is
reprehended. A good illustration is to tell a terminally ill patient that there
exist hopes of his recovery. In a system knowing privileged lies these are
usually harmless to the hearer. The answer “Not at home” is conventional, a
piece of politeness. “I do not know” may well be a lie, but may avoid much trouble.
In Buddhism, where there are no privileged lies, one may conclude that lies are
so injurious that no convenience can excuse lying. One may confirm this from
other indications, but to tell the tale a series of comparisons is called for.
If Judaism and Christianity provide material, Hinduism, approximating to the
matrix from which Buddhism sprung, is more interesting. If Hindu “privileged
lies” may do calculable harm, the victim’s convenience is ignored.
Renunciation
The laity opting
for Buddhism, after the three “refuges,” renounces five activities, the fourth
of them being lying.[6]
Fortunately for daily life he/she does not have to renounce abuse, backbiting,
and idle chatter. If this were required laywomen in particular might wonder.
But young aspirants to noviceship alert to the ten sikkhāpadas
(Vin.iv.105-106) had a surprise awaiting them. He/she renounces musā-vāda
(Skt. mṛṣā-vāda) (lying) in solemn form,[7]
and then discovers that by doing so he/she has renounced three quite separate
disapproved uses of speech which may not contain “conscious lying.” This recurs
when the renunciation is repeated before ordination as a monk or nun.[8]
They come up against pharusa (Skt. paruṣa, pāruṣika),
alternatively omasavāda (omṛṣyavāda),[9]
implying words that “touch” their victim, rude or harsh speech (for nuns see
Vin.iv.308-309); pisuṇa (Skt. piśuna, paiśunya),
backbiting (apart from defamation: D.iii.15); and then samphappalāpa
(Skt. sambhinna-pralāpa), frivolous, inconsequential speech.[10]
For lying the monk may be submitted to sangha discipline under pācittiya
number 1 (Vin.iv.1.5ff.); again under pācittiya number two for
abuse; and under pācittiya number three for backbiting of a monk
including slander of the same. For nuns the Pāli Pātimokkha
makes these offences numbers 97-99.[11] But
abuse, backbiting, and frivolous talk (itself not penalized) can all occur
without any deception intended. For verbal assault can well be reprehensible
even if true (The Laws of Manu (hereafter Manu) 8:267-277). For
novices’ information musā-vāda covers both truthful and
untruthful communications, and the rubric musā-vāda-vagga,
found in some places,[12]
suggests that the entire group protects the sangha.
We may look into “conscious lying” (cf. Vin.iv.214), for
which a novice may be expelled (Vin.i.85; iv.84),[13]
but first we should notice that lying has three aspects, only one of which is
obvious. Firstly lies deceive and the victim has a ground for complaint. Rarely
indeed may the liar encounter a skeptic who believes nothing without
corroboration, or the awesome cynic who is impervious to flattery
(S.ii.243-244). From these we pass to categories of lies that operate to the
hearer’s advantage, and again others which the hearer suspects to be false but
wants to believe (for example, “You are the most beautiful woman I have met”).
Slander and gossip are intensified where one elicits it from others or approves
of the result (Sn.397). Secondly lying may be viewed as an aspect of liars’
personalities. Lying is required for confidence-trickery, upon which a career
may be founded. A capable liar may achieve anything disreputable (Dhp.176).
Thirdly a lie, particularly flattery, may undermine a monk’s or nun’s search for
the “incomparable peace” (S.ii.242 paragraph 6, 243 paragraph 4). This aspect
will hold our attention.
Lying
Buddhists could
distinguish factual lies from lies with philosophical or religious contexts.[14]
Lying included equivocation (D.i.25) and it was punishable (D.iii.92-93). There
are no privileged lies that played a colorful role in other cultures.[15]
Every musā-vāda must have its ingredients, which the Vinaya
lays out with casuistic detail.[16]
There must be words uttered (though gestures may serve); the utterance is part
of an intelligible conversation; and there must be an intention to deceive
(Vin.iv.2). Five ingredients are listed: the object itself; the consciousness
of falsity; the attentive mind; consciousness of the lie containing the
intention to deceive (Sn.129); and the speech itself.[17]
A common example (M.i.286; iii.47-48) is where a witness before a tribunal
states he was where he was not, or saw what he did not see, or the reverse (cf.
Manu 8.13). One can tell lies about one’s opinions, equally reprehensibly.
Truth-telling will include honoring one’s promises (D.iii.170). The purpose of
the deceit is irrelevant. There are exceptions, not however “privileged.” Lies
are excused if they are jokes (Vin.iv.3), though not always (Vin.iv.11). No
rigorist has been recorded who would not utter a lie even by way of a joke,
like Epaminondas.[18] One
might falsely claim an enlightened status out of mistaken elation (monks’ pārājika
four; nuns’ pārājika six); this did not count as a lie. Alas,
not to reveal one’s offences was a “conscious lie” (Pātimokkha, nidānuddesa).[19]
The Textbook for novices of the Mahāsāṃghika
school, after handling lying, goes immediately to describe calumny. A baseless
accusation may suffice to revile a monk,[20] but
a well-founded imputation may be an offence under pācittiya 2.
False accusations intended to “ruin” a monk[21] are
naturally offences. Malicious defamation of a monk comes under sanghādisesa
8 (Vin.iii.157-166), indirect defamation under sanghādisesa 9
(Vin.iii.161-170). The Textbook’s author categorizes abuse under birth, name,
clan, work, craft, marks, disease, passion, attainment, and low mode of address
(following Vin.iv.4, 6-9). “You black thing; your family are sweepers” may be
truthful, but it leads to expulsion of the speaker from the sangha.
Ironical praise can be insulting and comes under this heading (Textbook trans.
IV.8). No one is too low to be insulted (Vin.ii.7-11).
Leaving calumny the Textbook takes up backbiting (Textbook
trans. IV.14, text p. 58). The Pāli Vinaya is thin on this topic. Pisuṇa
attempts to divide friends or obtain friendship by, for example, causing
dissension (Vin.iv.12, 14). The Vinaya title bhikkhu-pisuṇa
indicates monks as possible victims (others suggest the slander is by a monk),[22]
but the offence of pisuṇa is general. The words might be true or
false. The Textbook goes no further (trans. p. 65, n. 28). Samphappalāpa
is not an offence within the Pātimokkha. Perhaps it should have
been, seeing that it is a version of “animal-talk.”[23]
The section linking musā-vāda with pharusa
and pisuṇa is only apparently anomalous, because lies can figure
in both. The novice or monk, having renounced all lies, appreciates that abuse
and backbiting make pawns of their hearers. Expulsion results from either
misconduct (Textbook text p. 58, IV.16, trans. p. 65). Meanwhile to be abused
was welcomed amongst Hindus because the victim’s merit grew at the expense of
the abuser.[24] The sangha
would have none of that—the victim’s situation was irrelevant. Jain casuistic
rules regarding truth and lies are comparable with the Buddhist, save that certain
lies are privileged.[25]
Privileged Lies
The Vinaya,
as we have seen, allows certain untruths to pass unpunished when due to a
misunderstanding and innocent of a desire to deceive (Vin.iii.103-108). This is
not an exception to the ban on privileged lies. A glance at Hindu ideas may be
helpful. In Vedic times, truths, both factual and imaginary, reflecting myths,
were understood. Likewise in Manu’s time truth and religion were still related
(Manu 1.82; 4.175). Manu appreciates truth-telling (1.29; 3.40), unless
tactless (4.138; cf. Mahābhārata 1.77, 28; cf. M.iii.230).
When he requires the religious student to tell the truth (Manu 2.179;
cf. A.iii.153) he includes both types of truth; perhaps not merely to ease the
guru’s task. The role of student required truth-telling and chastity: competing
attachments were excluded. This we shall find useful. Truth-telling was
generally admired especially where cheating was possible (Manu 9.71).
Lies incurred punishments in other lives (8.94-96) and purification in this
(5.145). With this as the background one notices a list of lies which one might
tell without qualms. One should lie to save a life (8.104). With this Jains
naturally agreed. There was no crime in a Hindu’s false oath about desired
women, or marriages, fodder for cows, fuel, and helping a Brahmin (8.112).
Hindu authorities defend lies to protect wealth, even that of non-Brahmins.[26]
Long ago Anglo-Indian judges studied Manu in the Sanskrit, and it is no
wonder they fantasized about Hindu mendacity. They did not encounter Buddhism.
They tended to follow Cicero (De Divinatione 2.71, 146) in disbelieving
liars even when they spoke the truth.
Jewish Attitudes to Lying
Hindu and
Buddhist precepts concerning lies are contemporary with ancient Judaism. Praise
of truth and complaints against liars are common in Hebrew scriptures (for
example Psalms 4:3, 5:7), yet a want of general prohibitions (see below) is
striking. By the time this was noticed privileged lies had arisen. Rab Judah
said in the name of Mar Samuel (who died about 257 C.E.) that a scholar could
be presumed reliable in a question of lost property provided he told lies in
three contexts only. He might lie concerning a tractate (whether he knew it); a
bed (whether he performed his conjugal duties); and hospitality (whether it was
adequate)—a short but intriguing list.[27] One
might praise a bride’s beauty notwithstanding her manifest squint and limp
(Babylonian Talmud, Ket. 17a). One may lie for the sake of peace (Babylonian
Talmud, Yev. 62b). The list hardly developed; but what of the Jewish Law’s
prohibitions of lies? If Buddhism was comprehensive in condemning lies Judaism
had only a list of prohibited lies. These are (1) raising a false report
(Exodus 23:10); (2) being a tale-bearer (Leviticus 19:16); (3) joining in
deceitful proceedings (Exodus 23:7); (4) false testimony in court (Exodus
20:16; Deuteronomy 5:10; cf. Matthew 19:10); (5) false weights and measures
(Leviticus 19:35-36; Deuteronomy 25:13-15; Proverbs 11:1) and deceit in
commerce (Josephus, Apion 2.216); (6) false swearing (Exodus 20:7;
Leviticus 6:5, 19:12); (7) misdirecting travelers (Deuteronomy 27:18); and (8)
false prophecy (Deuteronomy 13:1-5, 18:20-23; Jeremiah 5:31, 43:2). The frauds
of Jacob are extenuated: Rebecca was the culprit and the Lord connived at a lie
of exigency (Genesis 27:13-24; Jubilees 26:9-19). Furthermore it was a civil
wrong falsely to accuse a bride of lacking virginity (Deuteronomy 22:13-21). An
innovative teacher could be accused of seducing the people,[28]
whether his words were unverifiable or not (John 5:30-31).
Despite his encomium of the Pentateuch (Apion 2.147)
and his praise of fellow-Jews for their skill in detecting deceit in others
(2.292) Josephus does not credit the Law with prohibition of lying as such; yet
post-biblical Judaism developed a condemnation of cheating (Babylonian Talmud, Hullin
94a) as G. F. Moore shows.[29]
True, many translations find a prohibition of lying even in the Pentateuch; but
Leviticus 19:11c can be rendered “thou shalt not cheat” (cf. the Jewish
Publication Society’s Tanakh (1985) and the New Jerusalem Bible
(1990)), and in its context (cf. Leviticus 6:1-5) verse 11c refers primarily to
commerce.[30]
At this point we should glance at the Qumran sectaries’
ideas. Their codes penalized severely one who lied about property (Community
Rule VI 24-25; Damascus Document XIV; cf. Acts 5:4,9), other lies being less
harshly punished, even general deceit (Community Rule VII.151; Damascus Document
XXV) and false accusation of a comrade (Community Rule VII.17). None of these
regulations claims scriptural authority; monastic conditions suggested
(evidently) an amplification of the Law. Rabbis of the post-Christian era
developed awareness of the sin of deceit, some cases being gathered by Moore.
Authentic opinions are reflected, in Maimonides’s Code, volume 2 (the Book
of Knowledge), chapter two, paragraph six, the particulars of which would
exceed our space.
Church casuistry on lying hangs from Exodus 20:16 (above).
Thus mere lying is not a grievous sin. Privacy and secrets must be protected;
the “emergency” and “officious” lies are venial. If Kant held (after St
Augustine) that lying was always wrong, the utilitarian view about privileged
lies gains favor. Mental restrictions are known; jokes are no lies; and there
are legitimate reasons for lying. Scandal and defamation are indeed reprehended
(Romans 1:29-30), but these are not necessarily lies (as we have seen). The
demands for truth at Ephesians 5:37 are subject to limitations.[31]
The word “liar” can be a term of abuse.[32]
Revilers and those given to “foolish talking” have hell as their destination
(Revelation 21:8) and Leviticus 19:11c seems to be applied widely at Ephesians
4:25. But it is significant that in none of the Christian lists of evildoers
who shall not enter the Kingdom of God (1 Corinthians 6:9-10; Galatians
5:20-21; Ephesians 5:4-5) do liars figure. The religious aspect of “truth”
persists in Christianity as it did in Qumran,[33] but
no Christian penalty for “liars” as such emerged in ancient times.
It could be surmised that the net difference between the
Buddhists and the Jews derives from the sangha’s needs (A.iii.153). A
monastic community can easily lose its reputation. A member guilty of musā-vāda
might well be unfit for monastic life. The Qumran folk, with their experience
of monasticism might well supplement the Law of Moses, which they revered. But
Christians, inveighing in passing[34]
against lying (Ephesians 4:25) well before their monasteries developed, issued
no comprehensive prohibition and on the contrary expanded the scope of
privileged lying, which came to include “lies of exigency.”[35]
Conclusion
Can the
discrepancy between Buddhist and Pentateuchal laws be explained by reference to
religion? In Hinduism lying was forbidden during sacrifices (cf. Manu
3.41). The patron of a Vedic sacrifice even had to avoid boasting of his
munificence after it, or he lost his merit (Manu 3.229-230; 4.236-237).
He had to remain chaste and plainly aspects of probity were required.[36]
From Vedic times “truth,” implying reality,[37] had
been associated with ṛta (the cosmic order):[38]
to tamper with one would prejudice the other. Truth-telling was virtuous.[39]
Untruth drew up the liar’s roots.[40]Varuṇa
punished the liar with dropsy (Ṛgveda 7.49,3; 59.3-4; Manu 8:82).
If a lie would vitiate a sacrifice the patron’s wife must confess her
adulteries. But we note that lying here appertains to the patron only—no harm
would come to anyone else if he failed to obey the rules. This line of thought
pre-existed the Buddha. Has he built upon it? The Jews had no such rules.
Indeed lying in matters of religion alarmed the Qumran folk (Damascus Document
I.15), and they penalized certain lies in their communities. By the time rabbis
had come to recognize privileged lies their system regarded all other deceits
as reprehensible.
The supersensory results of being a liar deserve closer
attention. According to Manu liars suffer penalties in the way of
inauspicious rebirths and may be liable to fines (8.89-108; 8.36, 59-60,
119-123). What harm they may have done is disregarded—the lie is a subjective
experience. Irrespective of what may take place within the sangha,
Buddhists agree (M.i.286, ii.149, 179, iii.209) that liars are reborn with bad
teeth and breath[41] and
throat diseases. Those guilty of pharusa-vācā encounter dust
and unpleasing sounds and sights, and those indulging in pisuṇa-vācā
contact harmful things, are elated by false reports and become involved in
general dissension.[42] Such
learning cannot be traced in Judaism, where certain deceits may be avenged in
heaven but in general the effects of lies remain in this world.
A solution to our question may lie more in Judaism’s
regarding each lie as an injury. Insults, too, and injuries deserve a judicious
punishment rather than retaliation. Such deeds are viewed from the victim’s
stand-point. In commerce lying is common. Truth may be suppressed and what is
false may be suggested. To insist on truth-telling hardly fits life as we know
it. The Pentateuchal prohibitions of specific lies attempt to obviate private
and public injuries. The case is different with the Buddhist sikkhāpadas
with which the novice and postulant for ordination are confronted. We look for
our solution in them. The series betrays a common element. Noscitur a sociis
(“he is known from his companions”) is a useful maxim. Musā-vāda
must have something in common with the other nine sikkhāpadas.
To renounce the taking of life protects, indeed, even
invisible, insignificant, and inedible creatures in water and turf, but it
benefits the novice him/herself. Murder is not the sole consideration. To
renounce “what has not been given” indeed protects householders and others but
it controls covetousness. Chastity is a personal condition: to renounce breach
of chastity will achieve more than protect novices from suspicion of rape or
seduction. Likewise intoxicating liquors fuddle the head—they injure no one
else. To avoid sleeping on high beds asserts a humble status (cf. Manu
2.198), indifferent to comfort. To eschew dancing, music, and other public entertainments
retains command over one’s mind. To reject garlands, perfumes, and ornaments is
to escape honorific or other adornments that others admire. To avoid eating at
the “wrong time” is to discipline the stomach, however helpful such a rule
might be for kitchens. Gold, silver, and even copper corrupt the recipient and
reinforce an interest in markets.
So the prohibition of lying, equally with those of pisuṇa
and pharusa, is devised to preserve the quest of the member or intending
member of the sangha, the same who must simply ignore gossip and chatter
whatever their content (S.i.201). That quest is prejudiced by watching the
opinions of others. Even enmity and especially jealousy are invisible ties to
the victim. Backbiting exemplifies this: one wishes the friendship of X who is
presently attached to Y; one is therefore emotionally tied to X. Even the
intention to deceive implies concern for another’s beliefs or plans. The liar
requires dupes as a spider requires flies. Though monks were not expected to
litigate in state courts, the rule that a nun may be expelled for bringing a
suit against one who defames her (Bhikkhunī-sanghādisesa 1;
V.iv.223-224)[43]
confirms that the nun’s perfection is foreign to civil law. She demeans herself
by retaliation on an enemy.
All these instances of dependence upon others are hostile to
a quest for the freedoms[44] of
Buddhism, freedom of mind and freedom of insight. Nor is this outlook confined
to monasteries. Even the committed Buddhist layperson had punishment to expect
in some bad fate, a much less significant consequence being the factual outcome
(vipāka) of misconduct. Taking life involves a person’s life being
shortened; lying involves a person’s being slandered; backbiting involves the
breaking of friendships; rude speech involves “unpleasing noise”; frivolous
talk indeed involves irrelevant communication—but it is the supernatural
results to the speaker that matter. He has not actually left the world.[45]
The happy rebirths or even nibbāna that the sangha
facilitates are prejudiced by every act of lying, and so forth. As soon as
these offences are confessed under the pācittiya rules the
individual returns to his path, purified (however temporarily) from those
handicaps. No such idea has as yet been found in non-Buddhist traditions.[46]
Even the concept “privileged lies” sounds absurd in Buddhist ears, having no
more sense than “privileged pilfering”—which in fact Hinduism had (Manu
8:37, 339, 341, 350-351).
Notes
(1) This supersedes J. D. M. Derrett
(1980). Return to text.
(2) M.iii.73; cf. vācāya
adhammacariyā-visamacariyā (M.i.286). To practice “right speech”
(sappurisā vācā) is to abstain from the entire series
(M.iii.23; cf. 230). Return to text.
(3) E. Hershey Sneath (1927:183) with abundant
citations. W. D. Paterson in J. Hastings (1900:113). Emphasis may be placed on
John 1:47. Return to text.
(4) 2 Samuel 15:6; Psalms 7:14, 15:2, 24:4, 34:13-141,
120:3, 119:118; Proverbs 19:22, 30:6; Isaiah 59:13; Hosea 7:1; Micah 2:11.
Neziqin 13.50-62 in Lauterbach (1961:105) (stealing hearts of people). Return to text.
(5) Popular works on Buddhist ethics include Tachibana
(1980, ch. 18) and Saddhatissa (1970:106-108). These abstain from comparison
save that Tachibana gives abundant references to Hindu “privileged lies” at p.
250, n. 1. Return to text.
(6) Ananda (attribution uncertain), Upāsakajanālaṅkāra,
220-224. For this work see Oskar Von Hinuber (2000, paragraph 386). Return to text.
(7) Sanghasen Singh (1968:52-58) (hereafter this is
referred to as “Textbook text”); Derrett (1983:59-65) (hereafter this is
referred to as “Textbook trans.”). Sanghasen Singh wrote on this compendium in Sanghasen
Singh (1975) and Sanghasen Singh (1986). He attributes the text to the sixth to
eighth centuries C.E. For all forms of “wrong speech” see Textbook p. 8 and
Pachow (1955:121-122). Cf. M.ii.35-36, 51, 101. Return to text.
(8) Sn 158; D.i.4, 135, iii.70-71, 232, 269. The series
is developed at M.iii.22, 33-34. At A.i.414 separate viratis are
required from musā-vāda and the set commencing with pisuṇa-vācā
up to samphappalāpa (cf. M.181-182). Even as late as Divyāvadāna
301.23 mṛṣā-vādikā appear in a catena of
sinners including paiśunikāḥ. For a king’s admonition
see D.ii.174. Return to text.
(9) Pruitt and Norman (2001:46), Pācittiya
2 (V.iv.6.5), also p. 194, no. 98 (for nuns). See also Thakur (1975:19, pācattika
2). Return to text.
(10) Tiracchāna-kathā, “animal talk,” is dealt with by
Derrett (2005:101-103). Return to text.
(11) Pruitt and Norman, Pātimokkha, p. 46,
p. 194. Return to text.
(12) Pruitt and Norman, p. 46. At p. 194-195 we find musāvādavagga
placed correctly at the head but wrongly at the foot. There are doubts at no.
106. For the connection see D.iii.106. Return to text.
(13) For expulsion as loss of status see Ste Hüsken, “The
application of the vinaya term nāsanā,” Journal of
the international Association of. Buddhist Studies 20 (1997) 93-111, p.
100. Return to text.
(14) For the first see Sn.122 (false witness),
242, 397, and D.ii.174; for the second see Sn.757, 885, 1131, A.1.149.
For prohibitions see Sn.400, 967. Return to text.
(17) Textbook trans. IV.10, cf. pācittiya 1
(V.iv.2). Whether one indeed deceives is irrelevant—the problem is subjective.
False accusations of a pārājika figure as sanghādisesa
8; of a sanghādisesa is pācittiya 76. To falsely arouse
remorse in others is pācittiya 77 (V.iv.147-148). Return to text.
(27) Babylonian Talmud, B.M. 23b-24a; Ket.
17a; Yev. 65b, 62a. Moore (1958:189). Return to text.
(28) For references see Derrett (2002:87, n. 9). See
also Derrett (1994). Return to text.
(29) Moore (1958), 168-191. See also Ecclesiasticus
7:12-13; Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 92a. Return to text.
(30) Maimonides’ Negative Commandment no. 249 (deceit).
Philo, On the Special Laws 4, 39-40: lies as part of a catena of immoral
acts commencing with theft. Jeremiah 23:32 and Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin.
55a. Zephaniah 3:13: on the Day of the Lord lies will cease. Return to text.
(31) See above n. 3 (Paterson, 1900), p. 113 citing
Genesis 20:2 and 1 Samuel 21:13. Davis (1943:410-428); Anon. (Dutch Hierarchy)
(1967:442-443); Jones (1984:227-229); MacNiven (1993:30, 55-56). The Gospel of
Thomas, log.6, line 18 attempts to correct the want of a prohibition (cf. also
Colossians 3:9). Catechism of the Catholic Church (2004), paragraphs
2452, 2484-2486, 2488-2489. Return to text.
(36) Note Manu 3.250. Scrupulousness stretches to
the ritual for the dead (śrāddha). Moral purification is
required (Manu 3.235). Buddhists ignore this requirement. Return to text.
(37) RV 1.85.11; 10.190.1; 10.34.2; 12.7.5, and
elsewhere. Truth is sight: B.U. 5.14,4. Return to text.
(38) Note RV 1.165.13; 1.165,10; 9.113,41; 10.5.7.
Kauś. U. 4,5. Truth and myth: .RV 10.85.1. Gods revere satyam: B.U.
5.5.1. The liar is destroyed by an ordeal: Ch. U. 6.16.1-2. Return to text.
(39) RV 4.5.5; 7.10.6; 8.79.6. There is an earnest
search for truth: B.U. 1.3.28. Injunction to speak truth: T.U. 1.1; 1.12. Return to text.
(43) Horner (1992:179, n. 7) enlarges on the point. Return to text.
(44) Chittanvimutta: D.i.80; A.ii.216; iii.21; paññāvimutta:
S.i.191; ii.123-125; vimutta-citta: A.ii.198-199; ceti-vimutta:
A.iii.290-292; cf. John 8:32-36. Return to text.
(45) A.iv.247-248, paragraph 40. Upāsakajanālaṅkāra,
p. 223, paragraph 127. According to William Shakespeare (As You Like It,
Act 5, scene 4), lying blemishes the gentlemanly image. Return to text.
(46) Mahāyāna sees the renunciations as
directed to the needs of others. Suzuki (1990:94-95). Return to text.
Abbreviations
A. Aṅguttara-nikāya
B.U.
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
D. Dīgha-nikāya
Dhp. Dhammapada
Ket. Ketubot
Kauś. Kauśītakī
Upaniṣad
M. Majjhima-nikāya
R.V. Ṛgveda
S. Saṃyutta-nikāya
Sn. Sutta-nipāta
Skt. Sanskrit
T.U. Taittirīya
Upaniṣad
V, Vin. Vinaya
Yev. Yevamot
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